

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIES TO ACCOMMODATE THE RISING TIDE OF  
IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN FLOW: THE CASE OF MOROCCO.

by

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## **Biography**

Lt Col Abderrahim El Hamoumi is an international student from Morocco attending the Air War College, AY-2016.

After graduating from the United States Air Force Academy in 1995 with a BS in Electrical Engineering, Lt Col El Hamoumi joined the Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF) where he earned his fighter pilot wings in 1997.

This international officer accomplished most of his professional military education (PME) through the USAF Air University to include SOS in 2004 and ACSC in AY-2007 earning a master's degree in Military Art and Sciences.

His duties and assignments in his early Air Force career range from serving as Weapons Officer to a Flight Commander in the F-5 wing of the RMAF. He eventually transitioned to fly F-16s where he first served as a Squadron Commander and then as F-16 Group Commander until the day he joined AWC.

## **Abstract**

Going on for thousands of years, the mobility of people has always been a controversial issue with attitudes ranging from openness and tolerance in good economic times, to resentment and even xenophobia, particularly during times of economic crises or slowdowns. Today, the geographic landscape of origin and destination countries for international migrants has changed fundamentally. Countries such as the North African and Muslim State of Morocco have turned from being, historically, net emigration countries to net recipient nations and thus started facing the same challenges and criticism that for long motivated their political rhetoric with regards to the West in general and the European Community in particular. Legitimate concerns stem from the inextricable link between migration, exclusion, identity crises and most importantly security challenges, especially with the current rising threat of extremism around the world.

State response has ranged from the logic of security and protection through tighter legislative and border control measures to that of openness and humanitarianism to win international support and secure economic and political benefits. “Whatever form state response may take, it appears that the nature of sovereignty in the international system is being reconfigured, not only by economic, military, religious and environmental developments, but by the presence of substantial expatriate communities actively leading transnational lives.”<sup>1</sup> Domestically, state integrity and social coherence are continuously challenged despite numerous efforts to smooth out integration. Internationally, the issue can no longer be ignored or decentralized in a context of globalization and interdependency of both risk and opportunity.

“I also call for making peace and stability top priorities to prevent conflicts, confront extremism and terrorism and address the migration problem using an approach that takes into account the dignity of migrants, preserves their basic rights and tackles the root causes of the migration phenomenon.”

King Mohammed VI to 70<sup>th</sup> session of UN General Assembly

## Introduction

Morocco has always been a land of diversity and a crossroads for human exchange and migration. Recently, the country has evolved into a transit land for migrants and refugees, especially from sub-Saharan Africa. Geographical proximity to Europe, its historical-cultural and religious ties to Africa and the Middle East, and the ease of travel from Morocco to Europe make it a favorable passageway for crossing the Mediterranean. Conversely, many of those who fail in their attempt prefer to stay in Morocco rather than return to their more unstable, unsafe, and substantially poorer countries. The reasons that make these migrants choose to settle can be linked to the political stability and security as well as the increase of promising employment opportunities in the country; not to mention the tradition of hospitality and the strong values of compassion and sympathy towards the stranded or the needy that characterize the Arabic and Muslim societies. Indeed, it is believed that approximately six million Syrian refugees have found shelter across the big Middle East from Rabat to Islamabad. Numbers oscillate from tens of thousands across North African states to millions in neighboring nations such as Lebanon or Jordan. Some countries, like the UAE which has absorbed nearly 200,000 Syrians since the war erupted in 2011, don't even list them as refugees.<sup>2</sup> Other nations, including Morocco, have granted the Syrians total protection and immunity from deportation.

Moreover, persistent demand for migrant labor in Europe, demographic factors and opportunities for improved education and better way of life, suggest that the propensity to migrate across the Mediterranean, even over formally closed borders, is here to stay. Evidently, the huge increase in foreign minorities confronts the Kingdom with an entirely new sets of legal, social and security issues which do not yet resonate with Morocco's self-image as an emigration nation. Under continuous pressures from the receiving countries that offer relatively substantial

incentives for stopping the migration flows, and in its attempt to adhere to universal laws and values, Morocco has recently opted to liberalize its immigration policy. Nevertheless, the country must be wary of the bigger social and security challenges inherent to such initiatives, and thus explore accompanying measures to ensure long term success. Indeed, the problem has now ample regional and international implications and subsequently requires equivalent levels of attention and investment.

## **Thesis**

After addressing the geopolitical factors and the security challenges inherent to the rising tide of immigrants in Morocco, this paper will evaluate the pragmatic and humanitarian approaches that motivated the Kingdom to liberalize its policies and advocate for increased multinational involvement and cooperation on the issue. It will then discuss how long term peace and stability in this age of globalization and interdependency require a greater deal of courage and ingenuity to balance between humanitarianism and state sovereignty.

## **Causes of the rising tide of immigrants**

### **Tightening entry conditions to Europe:**

To really grasp the issue and develop the right strategies and accompanying measures to mitigate its socio-economic and security implications, one has first to study some of the geopolitical and historical factors behind it. Undeniably, the overwhelming increase of sub-Saharan in the country is a direct consequence of the internal European laws and policies that over the years gradually restricted migrant influx. For centuries, the Mediterranean has been a place of exchange and cohabitation where African, European and Asian influences have produced hybrid and cross-cultural civilizations whose heritage and architectural vestiges go beyond today's geopolitical borders or the North-South rift. Up until recent history, the flow of

migrants was welcome, even encouraged by Europe, especially in the years after WWII, as Europeans were in desperate need for manpower to support their industrial and economic development and, in an earlier period, even fight their wars. Africans have continuously seized this opportunity to improve their economic and social status. After all, immigrants provide for their families back home and are often considered elites and first class citizens in their countries of origin.

However, things started changing towards the 1970s following the economic crises and socio-political impacts of larger, more demanding and somehow less integrated diaspora. European policy makers started adopting restrictive measures to halt human exodus and discourage recruiting foreign labor.<sup>3</sup> The French, in particular, introduced an entry visa for all African nationals by 1986.<sup>4</sup> The rise of transnational terrorism and the fear of the “other” in the post 9/11 world gave even more legitimacy to tighter security and border control measures from the EU. However, “If migration across the Straits of Gibraltar has declined as a result of controls enhanced by the institution of tighter policies and more robust security agencies such as “FRONTEX”<sup>i</sup> that extends its operations all the way down to African shores, the diffusion has not resulted in declining overall rates of migration.”<sup>5</sup> Such measures only pushed the problem further away from Europe and made the southern bank, including Morocco, a hub for clandestine and human trafficking activities, and eventually a concentration camp for migrants. A total of 136,603 foreign nationals from sub-Saharan origin were apprehended at Morocco’s eastern and southern borders alone between 2000 and 2009.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it is believed that more than 20,000

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<sup>i</sup> According to its official website, FRONTEX is an agency of the EU that was established on 26 November 2004 to manage the cooperation between national border officials securing its external borders. Its overall objectives encompass detecting and stopping illegal immigration, human trafficking and terrorist infiltration. Its operations extend beyond the Mediterranean to include the black sea, the eastern EU land borders and parts of the West African coast.

sub Saharan Africans are permanently scattered across the northern mountains and forests of the country awaiting their turn to illegally make it to the other side.<sup>7</sup> What is more alarming is the number of fatalities caused by wrecks, sinking and overboard of boats illegally ferrying migrants across the Mediterranean, which makes this area the deadliest transit route in the world, accounting for nearly 4,000 deaths in last year alone (figure-1).<sup>8</sup>




Figure 1  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com>

Without a doubt, setting foot in North Africa and Morocco in particular is considered the accomplishment of the first and most important leg of the journey. “If you are in Morocco, you are 20 percent done... many can work to pay off for the rest of the journey, including the bribes necessary for the cops and officials...” said a Nigerian immigrant who had found refuge in the Rif Mountains overlooking the Spanish port enclave of Melilla (Figure-2) and doorway to Europe.<sup>9</sup> In most cases, “migrants with money can hire a boat for around \$1,500 and sail across the Strait of Gibraltar. For \$5,000 you can choose to be smuggled in the boot of a vehicle directly through the Melilla crossing...But only a few can afford these prices”<sup>10</sup>. Not only that, but getting past the Moroccan border guards, the three layers of security fencing, the razor wire, motion sensors, CCTV cameras and the Spanish “Guardia Civil” is now virtually impossible.<sup>11</sup>



For many, Morocco has then become the end of a long journey terminated just a few frustrating kilometers short of their promised “Eldorado”.



**Figure 2**

<http://www.economist.com/>

### **New opportunities in Morocco:**

Nevertheless, the decision to temporarily or permanently settle in Morocco cannot only be explained by the tightening border security measures adopted by Europe. Many migrants have actually found in Morocco the opportunities they were looking for in the first place. The Kingdom is considered a comparatively stable and wealthy nation for most sub-Saharan migrants. Steadily, the country has over the years evolved into a competitive industrial pole and a major trade hub across Africa and the Mediterranean region. According to recent statistics and ratings published by the World Bank, “per capita GDP in Morocco remains 2.5 times higher than in Senegal and 3.7 times higher than in Mali.”<sup>12</sup> In 2013, it ranked first among African FDI recipients and has been in the top three for the last five years attracting investors from a wide range of industrial and trade sectors.<sup>13</sup> Of particular interest are the real estate and manufacturing projects such as the “Renault-Nissan” car plant or the “Tangier Med” seaport which are both located adjacent to “Ceuta”, the other Spanish enclave geographically located in mainland Morocco.<sup>14</sup> Besides providing tremendous employment opportunities for immigrants

of different professional background, skill sets and legal status, this strategically located site offers hope and various clandestine options to make it to Europe.

Furthermore, the recent development of the country has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of sub-Saharan youths with visas to pursue studies and embark upon professional careers. Most of them come on scholarships granted by the Moroccan government through the Moroccan Agency of International Cooperation (AMCI).<sup>15</sup> While their number was less than a 1000 in the early 1990s; today there are close to 20,000 registered in universities and colleges, studying mainly engineering, law and medicine.<sup>16</sup> The fact remains that every one of these registered students shelters on average three other illegal immigrants as close friends or family members. Moreover, African and, more recently, some Filipina women migrate as domestic servants and nannies for wealthier Moroccan households which are constantly increasing and getting more westernized.<sup>17</sup> The Arab Spring and the subsequent instability and security vacuum across the Sahel and MENA region, particularly in Libya, has made it easy for migrants and refugees of all sorts and origins to cross borders and seek refuge in Morocco. To say the least, the demographics of foreigners within the country has increased and diversified to include political, economic, ethnic, and social migrants as well as asylum seekers. They all have one of two things in mind: to settle in a more stable and promising country or to stay long enough to ready themselves for the “Final Crossing.”

## **New Challenges**

### **Violence and instability:**

Evidently, the questioned status of these immigrants and their inability to fully integrate into a new social and cultural environment, often generate a feeling of alienation and a climate of hostility. In addition to being forced to work at very low wages and often inhumane conditions,

migrants have throughout history and across civilizations been viewed through the lens of inequality and competition. They fall victims of the political and social rhetoric of stealing jobs and threatening the national identity. What makes things worse is that most of them tend to settle and live in confined and isolated areas where they become victims of maltreatment and violence by gangs and fanatic groups. Motivated by feelings of injustice and the natural instinct of survival, they often resort to delinquency and crime and hence develop a certain profile that hinders their acceptance and integration. In November 2012, the cover of a Moroccan weekly magazine represented sub-Saharan migrants as “the Black Danger” suggesting they increase drug trafficking, prostitution, and pose a human and security dilemma to the nation.<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, the displaced population has not only become a big social and economic burden, but the inherent intercommunal interactions and frictions it produces often lead to radicalism and xenophobic reactions; just the perfect ingredients of violence and terror. In particular, the villages and countryside around the two Spanish enclaves have become strongholds of routine aggressions sparking a vicious circle of criminality, revenge and racism. Not long ago, four Senegalese nationals were admitted to the emergency room of a major hospital in the city of “Fnideq”, bordering Spanish “Ceuta” after being brutally beaten. The perpetrators of the crime were five Moroccans who, in addition, stole cash savings and smartphones possessed by the Senegalese.<sup>19</sup> “There is no shadow of doubt, this is a racist attack,” said a law enforcement official, who went on to confirm that “this incident was probably linked to a rape of a Moroccan girl in a village nearby committed by a Sub-Saharan a few months earlier.”<sup>20</sup> Suffice it to say that participation by the local population in the search operation carried out by the police to track the author of the sexual assault, had turned adrift as several tents housing the illegal immigrants were burned or destroyed.<sup>21</sup>

### **Transnational crime and terrorism:**

The other challenge posed by the increasing tide of immigrants in Morocco and the neighboring region is directly linked to transnational crime and terrorism. With the rising demand for identity falsification, shelter, protection, transportation and ferry, trafficking networks of all sorts have found the perfect opportunity to flourish and expand their business. In many cases, the same networks involved in human trafficking are exploited to carry out other forms of illicit activities such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Immigration, in part, has evolved into a business managed by international criminals, functionally and operationally. Terrorist organizations also benefit from this rising tide of immigration to expand and carry out their activities amidst the chaos and the proliferation of small across the Maghreb and Sahel region, caused by the collapse of Kaddafi's regime. Intelligence reports unveiled that "illegal immigration in this part of the world is confirmed to be in the hands of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, so called Mr. Marlboro, the big boss of multi-purposes trafficking; the man who emigrated there some time earlier, had tied connections in south Libya with takfirist and mercenary jihadists."<sup>22</sup> Suffice it to say that terrorist acts from 9/11 to the recent Paris attacks can all be traced back to some form or another of immigration flaws and challenges. Correspondingly, the recent swift emergence and spread of ISIL have clearly shown the challenging nexus of terrorism, criminality, conflict and migration.

Clearly, Morocco started facing the same issues and challenges that European countries have been struggling with for a long time and consequently was obliged to provide solutions and compromises the Kingdom had been advocating for in defense of its own emigrants within the EU and around the world. In a nutshell, the scourge of migration and its challenges has evolved

to a level that Morocco can no longer ignore or manage through the traditional mindset of proscription and coercion.

## **Morocco's evolving strategies**

### **Contextualizing the Debate:**

Faced with these challenges and responding to the rise of pressures from many domestic and international institutions and organizations, Morocco has in recent years seen intense legislative activity regarding migratory issues. There is a long standing argument that Rabat has always approached the problem from its security aspect and “continued to play the policeman of Europe” when it came to managing sub-Saharan immigration.<sup>23</sup> Certainly, the country has leveraged the issue to gain numerous trade and financial benefits from European partners as well as advance some of its geopolitical and economic interests in the region. Over the years, Rabat has signed a raft of agreements with the EU aimed at strengthening border security and has been rewarded in return with millions of dollars in funding. In 2006 alone, the EU provided 80 million USD to the Kingdom for border management.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the country has always seen itself as an exporting country of migrants, and consequently was reluctant to conclude international agreements on human trafficking as well as a general readmission agreement with the EU. However, things started changing in the eve of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Particularly, concerns strengthened after the rise of Islamic extremism and the proliferation of international terrorism that hit the country in May 2003.

Six months after these attacks, the government issued its law n°02-03 of November 11, 2003 clarifying the rules concerning the entry and stay of foreign nationals in the country as well as new conditions and sanctions regarding irregular emigration and immigration.<sup>25</sup> Legislators saw this as a necessary reform of the legal framework that dated back to the French protectorate

and which they thought had become obsolete in the realm of current trends and challenges. On one hand, the law created the Direction of Migrations and Borders Surveillance (DMBS) within the Ministry of Interior Affairs charged with controlling borders and fighting migrant-trafficking as well as establishing a national strategy in the field of migration management.<sup>26</sup> On the other, the new regulation sought to guarantee basic rights to foreigners, such as the protection of some categories from deportation to include pregnant women and minors. Without a doubt, the introduction of the 2003 text had very good immediate effects as a deterrent and coercive measure for illegal immigration. Indeed, the number of arrests decreased by more than 50% between 2003 and 2006.<sup>27</sup> However, the means and ways used to carry out the new law generated a lot of criticism aimed especially at the discriminatory man hunts and interrogations that followed its institution as well as the massive arrests and deportations.

In reaction to violence against migrants, scapegoating by law enforcing officials, a vibrant civil-society sector started emerging and strengthening in the country. It united human-rights organizations and associations of Moroccan emigrants abroad, as well as sub-Saharan migrants, religious organizations, lawyers, and local migrant-support groups such as the infamous GADEM (Groupe Anti-raciste de Défense d'Etrangers et Migrants). These groups started playing a vital role in giving practical assistance and advocating for migrants and refugees' access to residency rights and public services. Indeed, until recently, lawmakers assumed that virtually all sub-Saharan settlers were "economic migrants" on their way to Europe. However, the country could no longer deny that a significant number have migrated for reasons that fall under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Eventually, in 2007, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) signed an "accord de siege" with Rabat, resulting in some limited improvements in the situation of refugees and asylum seekers.<sup>28</sup>

## Humanitarianism and regularization:

However, the real shift in the country's immigration policy is a direct consequence of the human rights changes introduced by the 2011 constitution which subscribes in its preamble to the principles, rights and obligations enounced in their respective charters and conventions. The reform also came as a reaction to the Arab Awakening and a result of the liberalization efforts that started since the mid-nineties. Hence, the new document provided for the creation of the National Human Rights Council (NHRC) put in charge of managing the issue of migration. In its first report, the Council insisted on establishing a legal and institutional framework for asylum, legally recognizing refugee status as issued by the UNHCR and most importantly, it recommended launching an integration process to support qualified migrants and their families. In fact, up to 2012, only 0.2% of the total population living in Morocco, actually held valid residence permits; and most of them came from France (29.2%) and Algeria (13.4%), evidently because of deep historical and family ties linking Moroccans to these countries.<sup>29</sup> However, a new category of refugees and asylum seekers was growing, especially in the realm of the geopolitical development herein discussed (Figure-3).




Figure 3

<sup>1</sup>2014 statistics , <http://www.processusderabat.net>

Other recommendations included banning all forms of violence against undocumented migrants, registration of new births and deaths as well as reforming the family reunification and citizenship law. For instance, “Moroccan citizenship law is based on ‘Jus Sanguis’ or descent. In principle, citizenship is automatically and only acquired by birth from at least one Moroccan parent.”<sup>30</sup> Under pressure from domestic and international NGOs, the Kingdom accepted the majority of recommendations from the NHRC, including a proposal on a revised asylum strategy respecting the principles of the UNHCR, temporary regularization of all unauthorized migrants and banning summary deportations. Eventually, in early 2014, the government launched its first integration campaign that led to the regularization of over 18,000 of the 27,000 candidates that seized the opportunity and vetted.<sup>31</sup>

However, many analysts believe the current Moroccan strategy is mainly aimed at promoting its interests and gaining more support from African and European partners for its national cause, especially that the Kingdom has, so far, refused to sign a readmission agreement with the EU. Such an agreement would mean Morocco would not only have to readmit its own nationals residing or entering the EU irregularly, but also non-citizens that have transited through its sovereign territory.<sup>32</sup> Critics argue that such confusion reflects the “characteristic ambiguity of Moroccan migration policies, which seek to simultaneously satisfy European, African and domestic policy interests”.<sup>33</sup> In fact, Morocco is considered a strategic Mediterranean partner for the EU which is seeking to promote a free trade agreement in the region. Meanwhile, the Kingdom is continuously seeking avenues to cultivate its political and business interests in Western and sub-Saharan Africa to gain regional support for its broader sovereignty and territorial claims.<sup>34</sup>



It is not whether this change of migration and integration policy was the result of long-standing pressures from the EU, a calculated policy to defend its geopolitical interests, or a serious attempt to take a leadership role in the region. The fact remains that the current change in policy has provided the country with the tools and the legitimacy to better manage and control immigration domestically, as well as a stronger position at the negotiation table to tackle the issue with its southern and northern partners. The challenge is how to make this policy a success and avoid social and political catastrophes in the long run.

### **Measures for success:**

#### **Promoting a new identity:**

Above all, Morocco needs to learn from the experience of its own emigrants in Europe and try to avoid the negative effects of broader tolerance and openness to the “other”. An effective and long term strategy to the issue must consider migration as an opportunity rather than a social, economic or political threat to the sovereignty or the identity of the nation. Clearly, the issue cannot be treated through the sole lens of humanitarian rights. These measures are important as they help alleviate a great deal of suffering, exclusion and hardships inherent to living as a minority in a foreign society. Long term success, however, must account for potential challenges to the nation’s identity and homogeneity that result from absorbing a large number of people with completely different religious and cultural beliefs. Indeed, “although there seems to be a growing state-led attempt to promote integration, social interactions among migrants and Moroccans remain limited,” notes Katherina Natter of Oxford University’s International Migration Institute.<sup>35</sup>

If there is one thing to learn from the EU’s experience, it’s that the legal framework governing emigration should include ambitious plans to empower the new residents while

promoting their sense of loyalty and accountability to the host nation. Writing about this dilemma in his book "Murder in Amsterdam", Ian Buruma concludes that there is a general belief in Europe that African immigrants tend to "milk-the state" and not contribute to the development of their host countries.<sup>36</sup> He goes on to argue that they seldom reach the required level of social integration, nor do they ever come to realize that they are accountable to the nation that provides for their children. Hearing of "Moroccan youths" who urinated on a street in Amsterdam's red-light district, the author muses that successful integration is really about "how to make those boys pissing on the seventeenth-century door feel that this is their home too."<sup>37</sup> Just like the Netherlands, Morocco is now viewed by some sub-Saharan migrants as a liberal and open society where they can enjoy all sorts of rights and freedoms. If nothing else, such freedoms may even widen the religious gaps or even reignite the ethnic clashes within the country. In return, sub-Saharan emigrants need to learn how to become active residents and citizens of Morocco. They need to develop a sense of ownership and belonging to the land that sheltered and provided them a second chance and hope for a better way of life. Moroccans on the other hand need to start seeing these settlers not as a threat, but as productive and responsible members of society who as much as they benefit from the system, they do contribute their share of responsibility and obligations.

The best way to go about this is to start by culture immersion programs to teach the local language, educate the new comers and build in them a sense of pride to be a part of the community they live in. In addition to learning the language, immigrants need to know the history and commit themselves to defend the national interests and values of their host country. These are the principles that facilitated adaptation, assimilation and pluralism in the biggest and probably the most successful story of immigration in recent history, the USA, and continue to

unite its citizens and attract people from all cultures.<sup>38</sup> A good way to go about this is to provide incentives through the participation in community services and eventually access to military service which is the ultimate sacrifice for the nation people call home. Other avenues would include the participation and postulation for political and syndicate positions. Brief, the next step in the process should enable immigrants to transition from limited residency to full citizenship. This would definitely require some legislative creativity, but the process has already started with the reform of the family code of 2007, adopted into the 2011 constitution, authorizing Moroccan women for the first time to transmit citizenship to children from foreign fathers.<sup>39</sup>

### **Addressing the Push Factors:**

Nevertheless, a more effective strategy to accommodate the rising tide of immigrants in Morocco and the Mediterranean in general needs to target its persisting “push factors”. In other words, substantial and coordinated efforts must be made to eradicate the real economic and social conditions pushing migrants to risk their lives and leave their loved ones behind in the search for a better life. Working closely with the EU or other partner nations and humanitarian organizations, Morocco has already taken a lead role in this endeavor. In addition to offering numerous packages of financial assistance, Rabat took the initiative during the 2000 Africa-Europe Summit to cancel all debts of Africa’s Least Developed Countries as well as provide free access to numerous African exports.<sup>40</sup> In 2007, Morocco also organized, in partnership with the UN Development Program (UNDP), the first African Conference on Human Development. Rabat has since engaged in and advocated for stronger and broader South –South cooperation financing small businesses, providing military training, and promoting investment in many income sectors to include telecommunications, transportation and banking.<sup>41</sup> Morocco currently cooperates with 22 African nations on counter narcotics, disarmament, migration, piracy, and

conflict resolution.<sup>42</sup> It also partners on triangular development projects with many specialized international organizations providing training programs in health care, sanitation, water infrastructure, and fisheries across the Sahel and West Africa.<sup>43</sup>

However, the challenge is much bigger than the ambitions and resources available. There needs to be a serious effort to build consensus among all North African countries as well as the EU to harmonize and optimize a strategy to “save” the continent. This means ensuring stability and laying the grounds for justice, freedoms, economic and social development within the nations exporting migrants, thus making the Mediterranean an extension of prosperity, rather than a symbol of antagonism and disparities. Debating the security issues in the Mediterranean, certain officials are even lobbying for the establishment of a “Marshall plan” for Africa, in order to allow a quick exit from the state of misery and desperation sentencing its people to hardship and displacement, and hence see no alternative to such measures to curb migration.<sup>44</sup> For them, all other previous and ongoing measures and initiatives such as the “European Neighborhood Policy”<sup>ii</sup> or the “Mediterranean Dialogue”<sup>iii</sup> have been partially effective because they only deal with the symptoms and do not attack the real causes of the problem.

### **A global contract for migration:**

Finally, it is probably time to lay the foundation for a durable global social contract cemented around a consensus on migration which can be supported by rules and institutions that

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<sup>ii</sup> Launched in 2003, The Policy (ENP) governs the EU's relations with 16 of its closest Eastern and Southern Neighbors (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine) with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. (<http://ec.europa.eu>)

<sup>iii</sup> Initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council, the Dialogue involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. It reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. (<http://www.nato.int>)

regulate and set standards for the international mobility of people.<sup>45</sup> Long ago, the world had thought about regulating trade of capital and goods as preconditions for prosperity, peace, and stability worldwide. Starting with GATT (General Agreement on tariffs and trade) towards the end of WWII, the idea gained more credibility and attractiveness that culminated with the institution of the World Trade Organization to take on this challenge and ensure reciprocity as well as a certain level of equal opportunity in matters of exchange and access to markets. The same analogy can be made in this age of globalization about the most important and precious commodity: human capital. Similarly, regulating this scarce but more and more influential resource for the purpose of smooth integration, stability, and above all a better state of peace may necessitate the establishment of a worldwide organization to regulate immigration, emigration and the overall matters pertaining to the movement of people.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, “international migration is no longer a ‘private fishing’ of demographers and human geographers... Migration has grown in extent and is becoming a more global and globalized phenomenon that requires global frameworks and solutions.”<sup>47</sup>

## **Conclusion**

History, geography and politics have played a big role in transforming Morocco from a migrants exporting state to a host nation and a settlement for people aspiring to a better way of life. Faced with the social and security challenges inherent to this development as well as pressures from domestic and international humanitarian organizations, the country has recently opted for the liberalization of its immigration policy in order to regulate the status of these aliens and provide them more protection and rights. However, the Moroccan case study illustrates that the dynamics of culture, resources, and geopolitics can seriously limit the long term success and effectiveness of such initiatives. Only through a judicious reform of their legal framework and a

comprehensive plan to make immigrants active and accountable members of their society can host states like Morocco alleviate the social tensions and xenophobic reactions inherent to absorbing and accommodating people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds.

Definitely, the issue can no longer be dealt with through an excessively economic based and security-oriented approach. A more comprehensive strategy should bring to the table international institutions alongside departure, transient and destination States. All need to engage in serious efforts and coherently combine all instruments of power to eradicate the root causes of unrest and desperation within departure nations through win-win development strategies. EU members in particular, need to go beyond the rhetoric phase and put into effect the goals of their migration policies in the Mediterranean according to the principles succinctly put forward by their Council President Van Rompuy: “prevention, protection and solidarity.”<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, in this age of globalization and interdependency where exchange, trade, transactions and flows have revolutionized the traditional meaning and utility of borders and barriers, it is probably time to institutionalize a global body to regulate and manage human flow worldwide, all for the sake of enduring peace and stability.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Laurie A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: Emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, (New York, Cambridge University Press: 2006) 223.

<sup>2</sup> Françoise De Bel-Air, “A Note on Syrian Refugees in the Gulf: Attempting to Assess Data and Policies,” *Gulf Labour Markets and Migration*, Gulf Research Center (2015), [http://gulfmigration.eu/media/pubs/exno/GLMM\\_EN\\_2015\\_11.pdf](http://gulfmigration.eu/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2015_11.pdf)

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